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Appellant Motor Cargo submits the following Reply Brief 
to the Brief of respondent Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Motor Cargo's argument on appeal is very simple. 
Paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B clearly provides for an 
excess premium refund in the event of cancellation by the 
insured. Paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B clearly provides 
for a minimum earned premium in the event of cancellation by 
the insured and refers to paragraph 13 as an applicable premium 
computation provision. Nowhere in paragraphs 13, 16, or any 
other provision of Retro Agreement B is there any language 
extinguishing Motor Cargo's express right to a refund under 
paragraph 13 in the event of early cancellation by the 
insured. Accordingly, the Trial Court erred as a matter of law 
when it refused to credit Motor Cargo with an excess premium 
refund of $56,931, an amount reflected by TIE'S own records as 
due Motor Cargo. 
In wrongfully denying Motor Cargo its right to a refund 
under paragraph 13, the Trial Court failed to follow and apply 
a fundamental rule of contract interpretation. Specifically, 
the Trial Court failed to give effect to the plain meaning of 
paragraph 13 providing for a refund. In doing so, it committed 
little, if any, analysis to support its conclusion. In fact, 
the Trial Court, in its Conclusions of Law, merely stated that 
paragraph 13 applied "under certain circumstances." The 
one-sentence analysis provided by the Trial Court is a far cry 
from TIE'S assertion that the court gave "due consideration" to 
all provisions of Retro Agreement B, including paragraph 13. 
The Trial Court further failed to give effect to the 
plain meaning of paragraph 16 which, in addition to setting the 
minimum earned premium upon cancellation, directly refers to 
paragraph 13 for purposes of computing the premium. TIE'S 
construction of the phrase "subject to" as it is used in 
paragraph 16 renders paragraph 16's references to other premium 
computation provisions (including paragraph 13) as mere 
surplusage. Such a strained and contradictory interpretation 
of paragraph 13 should be rejected by this Court as failing to 
comport with the reasonable expectations of Motor Cargo when it 
entered into Retro Agreement B. 
In the alternative, and assuming the Trial Court 
construed Retro Agreement B as ambiguous, the record reflects 
that the Trial Court completely ignored the extrinsic evidence 
presented by the affidavit of William K. Maxwell. (R. 175.) 
Maxwell's affidavit directly refuted the unreasonable inter-
pretation of Retro Agreement B urged by TIE as set forth in its 
affidavits. At best, the Trial Court should have held Retro 
Agreement B to be hopelessly ambiguous, requiring construction 
against TIE as drafter. The Trial Court's judgment and 
findings must therefore be rejected as clearly erroneous. 
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Finally, the Trial Court failed to address the issue of 
whether TIE'S wrongful retention of Motor Cargo's premium 
refund constituted an unlawful forfeiture. TIE'S forfeiture 
argument hinges upon the conclusion that Motor Cargo had no 
right to a refund upon early cancellation. As discussed above, 
Motor Cargo's right to a refund is clear and unequivocal under 
any event of early cancellation. Thus, TIE'S forfeiture 
argument crumbles at the outset. Moreover, the Retrospective 
Premium Report submitted by TIE to Motor Cargo clearly 
recognizes the windfall received by TIE when it wrongfully 
retained Motor Cargo's premium refund. 
Contrary to TIE'S arguments, the Trial Court erred as a 
matter of law in several respects in ruling on the issues 
raised by this action. The Trial Court's judgment should 
therefore be reversed by this Court and entered in favor of 
Motor Cargo in the amount of $42,971. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO AWARD MOTOR CARGO WITH AN 
EXCESS PREMIUM REFUND AS DICTATED BY THE CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS OF RETRO AGREEMENT B. 
A. Contrary to TIE'S Assertion, The Trial Court 
Failed to Follow Fundamental Rules of Contract 
Interpretation. 
In its brief, TIE asserts that the Trial Court followed 
appropriate fundamental rules of contract interpretation, 
citing to several rules, none of which are mentioned in the 
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Trial Court's Memorandum Decision or Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. Respondent's Brief, pp. 11-14; Memorandum 
Decision (R. 335-40); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R. 388-97). Instead, the Trial Court merely noted: 
In the first instance the Court is required 
to look to the terms of the contract and 
their plain meaning on questions of inter-
pretation. Only when the Court finds the 
contract to be ambiguous or inconsistent may 
it turn to the general rules of construction; 
i.e. favoring specific provisions over 
general, first dated provisions over later 
and construction against the scrivener. 
(R. 337, 393-94.) Contrary to TIE'S contentions, the Trial 
Court makes no mention of the fundamental rule of construction 
that a contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of 
its provisions, including conflicting ones, giving effect, if 
possible, to all. Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 
1980); Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 
1978) . 
The record below clearly reflects that the Trial Court 
failed to give the plainly mandated effect and meaning to 
paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B. For example, in Conclusion 
of Law No. 7, the Court states that M[p]aragraph 13 of the 
Agreement provides for adjustments to the premium for any 
excess premium under certain circumstances." (Emphasis 
added.) (R. 394.) Not only is this conclusion of law devoid 
of analysis as to what circumstances trigger the application of 
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paragraph 13, it is devoid of any analysis whatsoever. Never-
theless, the Trial Court proceeded to deprive Motor Cargo of 
its premium refund expressly provided for under paragraph 13. 
The lack of analysis by the Trial Court concerning 
paragraph 13 indicates the court's inability to successfully 
grapple with the interplay between paragraphs 13 and 16 in the 
event of early cancellation by an insured. Instead, the Trial 
Court took the "easy route" by merely stating that paragraph 13 
applies "under certain circumstances," without any further 
discussion or analysis. Under fundamental rules of contract 
interpretation, this Court cannot permit the Trial Court's 
decision to stand where the Trial Court failed to give full 
effect and meaning to paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B. 
Moreover, in its Conclusion of Law No. 11, the Trial 
Court, in construing paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B, stated 
that "[t]his paragraph makes no mention of any adjustments to 
these calculations, nor that there is to be a penalty of 10% of 
any premium so adjusted." (Emphasis added.) (R. 395.) It is 
puzzling that the Trial Court, in concluding that paragraph 16 
contains no provision mentioning adjustments, completely ignored 
the language in paragraph 16 which incorporates a provision 
(paragraph 13) specifically providing for adjustments. In 
addition, the Trial Court completely ignored the fact that 
paragraph 13 contains no provision mentioning a waiver of 
adjustments in the event of early cancellation by the insured. 
Once again, as discussed above, the Trial Court failed to 
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follow a fundamental rule of contract interpretation of giving 
full effect to all provisions in Retro Agreement B, including 
paragraph 13. The Trial Court's failure to define the proper 
scope and application of paragraph 13 should result in a 
reversal of its decision. 
The above conclusions of law, specifically cited to by 
TIE in footnote No. 3 of its brief, plainly establish the Trial 
Court's failure to follow fundamental rules of contract 
interpretation in reaching its decision. The Trial Court's 
inability to harmonize paragraphs 13 and 16 in the event of 
early cancellation by an insured constitutes reversible error 
and judgment should accordingly be entered in favor of Motor 
Cargo . 
B. TIE'S Argument that the Trial Court Correctly 
Applied the Plain Meaning of Paragraphs 13 and 
16 of Retro Agreement B is Erroneous. 
1. The Trial Court Failed to Apply the Plain 
Meaning of the Phrase "Subject To" as it is 
Used in the Context of Paragraph 16. 
It its brief, TIE incorrectly asserts that Motor Cargo 
failed to address the effect of the phrase "subject to" as it 
is used in paragraph 16. Respondent's Brief, p. 18. TIE then 
attempts to provide the Court with a "clear" definition to the 
phrase by referencing Webster's Dictionary and case law. 
However, as noted in TIE'S own case authority, this "expression 
has no well defined meaning" and is a "term of qualification 
which acquires its meaning from the context in which it 
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appears." Bulger v. McCourt, 179 Neb. 316, 138 N.W.2d 18, 22 
(1965). Thus, this Court must look to the context in which the 
phrase "subject to" is used in paragraph 16 in order to 
determine whether the Trial Court gleaned its proper meaning. 
TIE would have this Court hold that the "subject to" 
language controls, limits, and even negates the prefatory 
language in paragraph 16 providing that "the premium for a 
cancellation prior to the end of the term of this agreement 
shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions of 
this agreement . . . ." (Emphasis added.) (R. 11.) TIE'S 
argument is fallacious for the following reason. If we assume, 
as TIE argues, that the language in paragraph 16(a) takes away 
Motor Cargo's right to a premium refund, paragraph 16's 
reference to "other provisions" of Retro Agreement B for the 
purpose of premium computation becomes mere surplusage. As 
discussed above, this Court should not adopt an interpretation 
urged by TIE and accepted by the Trial Court which flies 
directly in the face of fundamental rules of contract 
construction and the plain meaning of paragraph 16. TIE 
drafted paragraph 16 to make a clear and direct reference to 
the premium adjustment provision of paragraph 13. Yet, TIE now 
urges this Court to interpret the "subject to" phrase as 
negating a clear directive and extinguishing Motor Cargo's 
refund right under paragraph 13. Such a strained and 
contradictory interpretation of Retro Agreement B does not even 
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begin to approach comporting with the reasonable expectations 
of Motor Cargo when it entered into the agreement. This Court 
should therefore reject the Trial Court's interpretation of 
paragraph 16 and enter judgment in favor of Motor Cargo. 
2. The Trial Court Failed to Apply the Plain 
Meaning of Paragraph 13 Dictating a Premium 
Refund to Motor Cargo. 
TIE argues that by its terms, paragraph 13 provides 
only that TIE credit or refund any excess premium "after" the 
Retrospective Premium has been computed at stated intervals. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. TIE then makes the illogical leap 
that based on the terms of paragraph 13, the Trial Court 
obviously concluded that paragraph 13 is not a "computation 
provision" and has no application to determining the premium 
due after early cancellation by the insured. Ld. TIE'S con-
clusion defies fundamental rules of logic and should be ignored 
by this Court as a non-sequitur for the reasons which follow. 
Paragraph 13 plainly provides for the computation of 
an excess premium refund following termination of Retro 
Agreement B.1 The mere fact, as pointed to by TIE, that the 
credit or refund of an excess premium is provided for after the 
1
 In accordance with the plain language of paragraph 13, the 
Retrospective Premium is calculated at several intervals 
following termination of the agreement. See also paragraph 12 
setting forth guidelines for computing the Retrospective 
Premiums. Paragraph 12 also recognizes premium computation 
following termination of Retro Agreement B. 
-8-
Retrospective Premium has been computed at stated intervals has 
no bearing on Motor Cargo's right to a refund. That is, the 
timing of computing the Retrospective Premium has no effect 
whatsoever on the right to a premium refund provided for by 
paragraph 13. Paragraph 13 plainly sets forth that a premium 
refund is calculated following termination of the agreement. 
TIE'S argument falls flat on its face in light of the plain 
meaning of paragraph 13. 
C. The Retrospective Premium Report Submitted by 
TIE to Motor Cargo on its Face Admits to a 
Premium Refund of $56,931. 
TIE finally contends that a premium refund under para-
graph 13 is allowed "provided that the Retrospective Premium 
for the term of this agreement is le-ss than all premium paid 
. . . ." Respondent's Brief, p. 20. TIE then states that 
Motor Cargo canceled before the agreed term had ended. Id. 
Although it is unclear from its brief, TIE appears to be 
arguing that because Motor Cargo canceled Retro Agreement B 
before the agreed "term"2 had ended, the Retrospective 
Premium for the term of the agreement could not be calculated. 
Paragraph 1 of Retro Agreement B defines the term of Retro 
Agreement B as commencing on March 31, 1982 through March 1, 
1985, "unless terminated earlier by the cancellation of said 
policy . . . ." Thus, the term of Retro Agreement B can either 
be the express dates as agreed to by the parties or upon 
cancellation by TIE or Motor Cargo. Accordingly, and 
consistent with TIE'S own records, Motor Cargo was entitled to 
an excess premium refund of $56,931 when it canceled Retro 
Agreement B on March 1, 1983. 
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TIE'S argument is wrong in two respects. First of 
all, the term ended upon cancellation by Motor Cargo, thus 
giving rise to a premium refund under paragraph 13. Secondly, 
following cancellation of Retro Agreement B by Motor Cargo, TIE 
calculated the Retrospective Premium, made subsequent adjust-
ments, and concluded in a Retrospective Premium Report that 
Motor Cargo was entitled to an excess premium refund of 
$56,931. See Retrospective Premium Report dated September 30, 
1985 (R. 180). This report is a clear admission by TIE that 
the Retrospective Premium can be and is calculated in the event 
of early cancellation by the insured. In fact, the report calls 
for a $56,931 refund from TIE to Motor Cargo. Thus, there is 
no merit to TIE'S argument that Motor Cargo's early cancellation 
prevented computation of the Retrospective Premium for the term 
of the agreement, thereby depriving Motor Cargo of its express 
right to a premium refund. 
In a desperate attempt to take away Motor Cargo's 
right to an excess premium refund under paragraph 13, TIE 
argues that an "excess premium" cannot exist where the "minimum 
earned premium" under paragraph 16 has not been fully paid by 
an insured. Respondent's Brief, pp. 20-21. TIE'S argument 
brings to mind the old adage "comparing apples with oranges." 
That is, TIE improperly attempts to borrow the "excess premium" 
language from paragraph 13 and apply it to the "minimum earned 
premium" language of paragraph 16. The major flaw in TIE'S 
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interpretation is that paragraphs 13 and 16, while operating in 
connection with each other, address two separate issues under 
Retro Agreement B. Paragraph 13 clearly provides the vehicle 
for computing an excess premium refund to the insured upon 
early cancellation of Retro Agreement B. On the other hand, 
paragraph 16 merely establishes the minimum earned premium, 
from which any premium refund computed under paragraph 13 must 
be deducted. Here, following Motor Cargo's cancellation, TIE 
clearly acknowledged, through its Retrospective Premium Report, 
an excess premium refund of $56,931 due Motor Cargo. Thus, the 
Trial Court should have setoff this amount against the $13,960 
claimed by TIE, and awarded the balance of the premium refund 
to Motor Cargo. 
In its brief, TIE readily admits that Retrospective 
Premium Reports are "issued periodically to show how the Retro-
spective Premium has been computed for the period indicated on 
the report." Respondent's Brief, p. 21. TIE then goes on to 
state that the report "creates no rights to credits or refunds 
under circumstances of early cancellation by the insured." Id. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this case deals 
specifically with the Retrospective Premium Report which, on 
its face, clearly makes all the necessary calculations required 
and dictated by paragraph 13, and concludes that Motor Cargo is 
entitled to an excess premium refund of $56,931* TIE, however, 
continues to maintain that Motor Cargo is not entitled to such 
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refund and that the sole purpose and legal effect of this report 
is to show the Retrospective Premium computations so that a 
determination can be made whether it or the Basic Premium is 
greater. Ld. at 22. If such were the case, there would be no 
reason whatsoever for TIE to go beyond mere calculation of the 
Retrospective Premium, as it did in this case, and conclude 
that Motor Cargo is entitled to an excess premium refund of 
$56,931 as of September 30, 1985. (R. 180.) There does not 
appear to be any explanation, nor has TIE come forward with any 
explanation, as to why such premium refund computations were 
made and submitted to Motor Cargo. The blatant contradiction 
between the report and TIE'S arguments below and on appeal 
plainly establishes and exposes the illogic and tenuousness of 
TIE'S arguments urging denial of Motor Cargo's right to an 
excess premium refund. 
In summary, the Trial Court erred in its decision when 
it failed to follow fundamental rules of contract 
interpretation by not giving full effect to the plain meaning 
of paragraphs 13 and 16 of Retro Agreement B. Moreover, the 
Trial Court failed to reconcile its interpretation of 
paragraphs 13 and 16 with the Retrospective Premium Report 
submitted by TIE to Motor Cargo clearly acknowledging an excess 
premium refund to Motor Cargo. Accordingly, the Trial Court's 
decision below should be reversed and entered in favor of Motor 
Cargo. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RESOLVED ANY ALLEGED 
AMBIGUITIES IN RETRO AGREEMENT B IN FAVOR OF TIE. 
As will be discussed below, it is unclear from a reading 
of the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law whether or not the court construed the 
terms of Retro Agreement B to be clear and unambiguous. 
Assuming the Trial Court determined the agreement to be 
ambiguous, Motor Cargo contends that it failed to properly 
consider all extrinsic evidence presented below in resolving 
any alleged ambiguities in Retro Agreement B. 
A. The Trial Court Erred When it Failed to 
Consider the Admissible Portions of William K. 
Maxwell's Affidavit. 
The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law state that Retro Agreement B is 
clear and unambiguous and does not entitle Motor Cargo to an 
excess premium refund. (R. 339, 395.) In its Memorandum 
Decision, the Trial Court summarily explained the effects of 
each provision it deemed relevant in determining the premium 
entitled to TIE upon early cancellation by Motor Cargo. As 
discussed above, the Trial Court made a vague reference to 
paragraph 13 without providing any meaningful analysis as to 
its proper application. 
In making its findings and conclusions, the Trial Court 
adopted in wholesale fashion a set of Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law drafted by TIE, which included numerous 
references to extrinsic evidence presented to the Trial Court 
concerning the interpretation of Retro Agreement B. None of 
the extrinsic evidence inserted by TIE into the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were part of the 
Memorandum Decision. However, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law nevertheless conclude that Retro Agreement B 
is clear and unambiguous. The apparent inconsistency between 
the Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law further supports Motor Cargo's argument concerning failure 
of the Trial Court to apply fundamental rules of contract 
interpretation to Retro Agreement B. This fact alone warrants 
reversal of the Trial Court. 
Even assuming that the Trial Court construed Retro 
Agreement B to be ambiguous, Motor Cargo nevertheless maintains 
that the Trial Court failed to properly weigh and consider all 
relevant extrinsic evidence, including the admissible portions 
in the affidavit of William K. Maxwell, in determining the 
reasonable meaning and effect of paragraphs 13 and 16 of Retro 
Agreement B in accordance with the reasonable expectations of 
the parties. (R. 175.) 
TIE argues that the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are based on the "unopposed and unrefuted" 
affidavits submitted by TIE and that consequently there is no 
basis in the record below to support a determination that the 
findings and judgment were clearly erroneous. Contrary to 
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TIE'S assertions, its affidavits are directly contradicted by 
the admissible portions of the Maxwell affidavit. Specifically, 
Maxwell's affidavit directly refutes the interpretation of 
paragraphs 13 and 16, forwarded by TIE and purportedly supported 
by the affidavits of Paul J. Semons and Wendell Wells. 
As noted by TIE in footnote 10 to its brief, the Trial 
Court ordered paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7 of Maxwell's affidavit 
stricken to the extent that they contained hearsay and opinion 
evidence. TIE then states that the remaining relevant portions 
of Maxwell's affidavit are refuted or discredited by his own 
supplemental affidavit. TIE fails to recognize and apprise this 
Court of the specific portions of Maxwell's affidavit which 
operate to establish Motor Cargo's reasonable interpretation of 
Retro Agreement B that it would not forfeit its right to an 
excess premium refund under paragraph 13 in the event it decided 
to cancel the agreement prior to the end of the term. The Trial 
Court's failure to accept and apply the admissible portions of 
Maxwell's affidavit renders its findings and judgment clearly 
erroneous. 
Maxwell, who was an insurance agent of TIE, after care-
fully reading Retro Agreement B, expressed to Motor Cargo's 
officer, Harold Tate, that in his opinion Motor Cargo would not 
lose its right to an excess premium refund in the event of 
early cancellation. (R. 176.) Although Maxwell's opinion 
itself was stricken by the Trial Court, the fact that this 
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opinion was communicated to Mr. Tate prior to Motor Cargo's 
decision to cancel is admissible to support Motor Cargo's 
reasonable interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 16 in the event 
of cancellation. Moreover, Maxwell's affidavit further states 
that his opinion was also based upon the opinion of another 
insurance agent, James Keddington, employed by Diversified 
Insurance Brokers. (R. 176.) Once again, although the opinion 
itself of Keddington was stricken by the Trial Court as inad-
missible evidence, the fact that Maxwell relied on this opinion 
is admissible evidence, lending support to the reasonable 
interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 16 forwarded by Motor 
Cargo. There were no Findings of Fact made by the Trial Court 
concerning these communications, which implies that the Trial 
Court failed to acknowledge this evidence. This failure 
constitutes reversible error. 
Upon careful review of TIE'S affidavits, it is clear that 
Motor Cargo was never told by TIE that, in the event of early 
cancellation under Retro Agreement B, Motor Cargo would lose 
its right to an excess premium refund provided by paragraph 13. 
As stated in TIE'S brief, Wendell Wells, one of TIE'S represen-
tatives, stated in his affidavit that he conducted preliminary 
discussions with representatives of Motor Cargo regarding the 
execution of Retro Agreement B. Respondent's Brief, p. 25. In 
these discussions, Wells stated that he explained the contents 
of Retro Agreement B to Motor Cargo's representatives and, in 
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particular, Mhow the cancellation provisions of paragraph 16 
would apply." IcI. He then further explained that: 
[A]11 interim refund and premium adjustments were 
subject to a final adjustment and settlement at the 
end of the agreed three-year term . . . . if the 
agreements were terminated by Motor Cargo before the 
end of the three-year term, that the provisions of 
Paragraph 16 of the Retro Agreement would apply, and 
that the premium then due would be the greater of the 
retrospective or basic premium computed under the 
terms of the policy, plus a ten percent (10%) short-
range cancellation charge, and that Motor Cargo 
would lose the benefits of retrospective rating. 
(R. 229-30.) Based upon this evidence, the Trial Court 
specifically made Finding of Fact No. 16: 
The cancellation provision was specifically 
explained to an officer of Motor Cargo when the Retro 
Agreement was entered into, that is, that in the 
event of cancellation of the Policy before the three 
(3) year term ended, Motor Cargo would lose the 
benefit of retrospective rating. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 392.) 
Nowhere in the affidavits of Semons or Wells, or anywhere 
in the record, is there any evidence that TIE explained to 
Motor Cargo at the time it entered into Retro Agreement B that, 
in the event of early cancellation by Motor Cargo, it would 
lose its right to an excess premium refund expressly provided 
for under paragraph 13. Finding of Fact No. 16 clearly 
acknowledges this shortcoming. The Trial Court erroneously 
equated "losing the benefit of retrospective rating" with 
losing the right to an excess premium refund. This conclusion 
is totally unsupported by the record. At best, the Trial Court 
should have concluded that Retro Agreement B was hopelessly 
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ambiguous and that based on general principles of contract 
interpretation involving insurance agreements, the ambiguity 
should be read and interpreted against TIE as drafter of Retro 
Agreement B. The errors committed by the Trial Court warrant a 
reversal of its judgment entered in favor of Motor Cargo. 
B. TIE Misconstrues the Doctrine of Strict 
Construction Against the Drafter as it Pertains 
to the Interpretation of Insurance Agreements, 
In its brief, TIE states that Motor Cargo erroneously 
contends that any ambiguity in Retro Agreement B should be 
construed against TIE as drafter. TIE goes on to state that 
the doctrine is not a "trump card" that may be played by Motor 
Cargo any time ambiguity exists. Respondent's Brief, p. 27. 
TIE completely mischaracterizes Motor Cargo's argument. Motor 
Cargo does not perceive the above doctrine as a "trump card" 
that can be played any time ambiguity exists. Rather, Motor 
Cargo contends the doctrine should apply where, as here, the 
record is devoid of any meaningful extrinsic evidence resolving 
any ambiguity presented by paragraphs 13 and 16 of Retro 
Agreement B.3 
3
 This Court has recognized the application of the doctrine 
in this context. In its brief, TIE cites to Wilburn v. 
Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1988), an action 
decided by this Court involving the interpretation of a 
settlement agreement. It is critical to note that, in Wilburn, 
this Court clearly acknowledged in a footnote that "absent 
meaningful extrinsic evidence as to intent, recourse must be 
had directly to the maxim that ambiguities should be construed 
against the drafter." Id. at 585, n. 2. 
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Utah cc^ii ts have found > "it doctrine or tn<" :crist ructui, 
against the i *" * • 
interpretat i-.Ji • ; nisuioncc tontfactb. LPS Hospital v. Capitol 
Life Ins. Co. , 765 P. 2d — : h-R-^M pit ah s'-Jw • , ' 
ack now] edged rati « :" - . • , n. , »
 t*. \ati 01 1 :i s 
:: he need t-" if ford the insured the protection he or she 
endeavored tc secure hy : *v • : •; i"^ '"iiir,.)( (luutnote omit' ; 
Metropolitan Prop. & Liability v. Finlayson, 7 51 P. 2 d ? 5 ^  ., - V7 
(Utah App. 19 88) . 
P:. d i - .--. >• ; • , » • • . .; v • • . ' . - r ' • - . - i . -.-
parties concerning .iiieipteution .)f paidgrapris 1.3 and ib do 
not operate to resolve any ayoarenf ambiguity oresented ty 
thes*-1 pi ovisrjns , .-,-»-}, •.)'.• :*' r - . . •.*-  _-? * y acknowledge 
an unresolved ambiguity concerning the ioteipiay between. 
paragraphs 13 ar^ t * of Retiu Agreement D up* ^ 
cancelation t*y ' tt-< insured. 
As discussed above, the affidavits of Wells and Semons do 
* r 
record, supporting f n- concm^!. . • -i.. fri .toi * drgo was apprised 
*u the fact * hat Lt woi il d 1 ose any rigt * to an excess premium 
ref \r \ :>r b;:; p a r a g r a p h 1 3 i I • I: e a r ] y 
cancellation under the agreement : i ' the extrinsic 
evidence presented * <: : he Trial Cor' : x«. .• not contai n a 
"sei?:: !
 ; ; r; • - evije!;u. •;>ip\.< ?r wia i I)* ,-. interpretation of 
paragraph 13 in the event of early cancellation by the insured. 
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In summary, assuming the Trial Court below interpreted 
Retro Agreement B to be ambiguous, it failed to adequately 
consider and apply the extrinsic evidence presented by the 
affidavit of William K. Maxwell. Moreover, the Trial Court 
misinterpreted the evidence presented by TIE'S affidavits. Had 
it given appropriate weight and consideration to the admissible 
portions of Maxwell's affidavit, the Trial Court would have 
readily concluded that Retro Agreement B was hopelessly 
ambiguous and should therefore be construed against TIE as 
drafter. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision 
of the Trial Court and rule in favor of Motor Cargo. 
Ill 
THE RESULT REACHED BY THE TRIAL COURT HAS RESULTED 
IN AN UNLAWFUL FORFEITURE BY MOTOR CARGO OF ITS 
RIGHT TO AN EXCESS PREMIUM REFUND. 
A. Contrary to TIE'S Assertions, Motor Cargo's 
Early Cancellation of Retro Agreement B has no 
Effect Upon its Right to Receive an Excess 
Premium Refund. 
It its brief, TIE argues that as a result of its early 
cancellation under Retro Agreement B, Motor Cargo has no right 
to an excess premium refund. Respondent's Brief, p. 29. TIE 
then states that Motor Cargo cites no authority to support the 
proposition that a forfeiture is unenforceable when the loss of 
such right is "predicated upon the voluntary act of terminating 
or canceling a contract." While this may be true, conversely, 
TIE has cited no authority, nor is Motor Cargo aware of any 
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a u t h o r i t y , w h . c h h r j0 :< • n,jt .> f o r f e i t u r e i s e n f o r c e a b l e when 
t!: 1 e 1 :) s s i s p i: e d i c a t e d \ i p o i 1 c • :) 1 i I i I t a r y a ::: t : f t e i: n t i n a t i i I • :j : i : 
cance 11ng a canttact. 
TIF further stages that the resul4 s^ iir* ' r\ v»nt
 r 'argo 
i iecess-1 , • -
totally disregarding paragraph 16. Respondent's Rriet, ; . -1, 
As discussed above, f his asser';on is coinple*"?ly false. Motor 
Cargo does no^ contend tha*- n ic not entici ;d tc 'he premium 
provided by paragraph h d Rather, Motor Cargo merely 
under paragraph ib i i or !>-• excess premium refund afforded to 
Motor Cargo under paragraph 1 ^  
r] , « - 1 i i . • . i •
 : ic 1 i ided i .1 la t b e c a u s e Mo to i: 
Cargo h *d not made full payment of the minimum earned premium 
speciried in paragidpn xo\ ' i.; not entitled to an excess 
premium refund .mier paraai i,i (R. • •*£ ) As discussed 
above, ihe Trial Court incorrectly "compares apples with 
triggered upon early cancellation y :u insured, the amounts 
under esc:) -i r ^  computed separately and thereafter reconciled 
Cargo had not made full payment of the minimum earned premium, 
it was not entitled tu an exces: ,*-OT :•::*! refund under 
paragraph , . .-.:..: aere cou;.; * .eretoij I-P no f-iiteuure, 
_21-
requires this Court to engage in a frustrating exercise of 
illogic and strained interpretation which should be rejected. 
B. Contrary to TIE'S Assertions, Paragraph 16 of 
Retro Agreement B Contains No Forfeiture 
Language. 
Contrary to the assertions by TIE in its brief, there is 
no language in paragraph 16, nor has TIE or the Trial Court 
pointed to any specific language, declaring that Motor Cargo's 
express right to an excess premium refund under paragraph 13 is 
forfeited upon early cancellation by Motor Cargo. Moreover, 
paragraph 13 likewise does not contain any language stating 
that Motor Cargo loses its right under this paragraph upon 
early cancellation. There is no clear and unequivocal language 
in paragraph 16 to support the conclusion that it is a 
forfeiture provision which denied Motor Cargo any right under 
paragraph 13 to an excess premium refund. Consequently, the 
Court should declare the denial to Motor Cargo of its excess 
premium refund in the amount of $56,931 as an unlawful 
forfeiture under the express language of Retro Agreement B. 
C. The Trial Court's Failure to Properly Apply 
Paragraph 13 Upon Cancellation by Motor Cargo 
has Resulted in a Grossly Excessive Award to 
TIE. 
In response to Motor Cargo's assertion that TIE has 
recouped its expenses, contractual profits and overhead through 
the judgment awarded to it below, TIE contends that there is no 
admissible evidence in the record supporting this assertion. 
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I n f a c t ; T I E i n c o r r e c t l y a s s e r t s t n a t ».r - ** i *.- a d m i s s i b l e 
c onip e t e i 11 e • - ^  " e r w * * - 11: 1 e S i 1 p p 1 e -
m e n t a l A f f i d a v i t of P.-KJ ; . >enu-:is '; i: ' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , 
1 ^ 2 - 2 2 7 * r w h i c h h e s t a t e ? that f h r - I T • a i m e d cb;c :-•-* T I E 
- :• 'er • •.:•'-.' .greemerr is not 
. n addition to TIE'S profits on the Retro Agreement oi 
addiM":^ *• o Lue minimuiii premium ^ «,- . -
the ketio Agreement " Responder. * buir_- . Although the 
Trial Coui '' -truck * h* /.cut ions : w: . * ''a-'w^ll' affidavit 
constitutes admissible, competent evidence an-' speaks tor 
itself to rebut r he statements made in Semons --upplemental 
affi da\ :i t. *. - . •• • \^ K C ; : ospect . . c .:• . u;:. Report 
clearly indicate. *. hat part * computing ih^ [retrospective 
Premium included aeauc '* c^ ^^ • . • -
during l*he ^ P r m as well ji j Jtivh.e ice • >£ 1 .-. b% »•• r he ha^ic 
Premiu11 \ - ] 80 ) • < "i^re i . - : <" admissible 
compete"-*- <•-** • 3er • i •; 1 > 
indeed tecouped . * -• expenses c^rid contractual profits through 
*-•>• "judgment awairie"* ' » •" bp I ^ w and l t i d r i i t - ' o n a H y r e t a i n e d 
-? :< a e S S L • ^ • .: • • • . -J i < i . 
Therefore, the amount .swarded ? H E bel« w by -he Ti t a ; Court 
is grossly excessive •: ;*• ces TIE w e i dfi undeceived 
--L::U: :. i. . nsequent ,> , t. ,*,..-. court, srwu i declare the retention 
ry TIE; of Motor Cargo's excess premium refund as an unlawful 
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forfeiture, and accordingly reverse the Trial Court and enter 
judgment in favor of Motor Cargo. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to TIE'S arguments set forth in its brief, 
the Trial Court committed reversible error in several respects. 
First of all, the Trial Court did not follow fundamental rules 
of contract interpretation when it failed to give proper effect 
to the plain meaning of paragraphs 13 and 16 of Retro Agree-
ment B. Paragraphs 13 and 16 clearly provide for premium 
adjustments or amounts, respectively, which are computed and 
reconciled upon early cancellation. TIE'S own Retrospective 
Premium Report follows this procedure, a procedure the Trial 
Court wrongfully rejected. Secondly, the Trial Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
are inconsistent and do not unequivocally establish whether the 
Trial Court interpreted Retro Agreement B as ambiguous. 
Assuming the presence of an ambiguity in Retro Agree-
ment B, the Trial Court erred when it ignored the admissible 
portions of William K. Maxwell's affidavit which directly 
refute TIE'S interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 16 supported 
by its own affidavits. At best, the Trial Court should have 
concluded that paragraphs 13 and 16 were hopelessly ambiguous 
and should be interpreted against TIE as drafter. 
Finally, this Court should declare, as an unlaw-
ful forfeiture, the Trial Court's awarding to TIE, in 
addition to its out-of-pocket expenses and a profit, 
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the excess premiuir ;efuud riqhtfully due Motor Cargo Nowhere 
in par agraph . ; - - j ~ • 
is there "clear and unequivocal" i irigudq*- JIL«'<M inu * rit- aai <>h 
arid inequitable forfeiture snuqht hy T I E . 
Ba s*1': I • *•: . - l e e . i • : 
findings are wrong as a matter or ; Jw 111 s, Motor Cargo 
respectfully requests • hat t-h: n Court reverse the i'ria : ;= ; * ' ; 
deniai -;r its count, ere-.1: . -I-.A enter judgment awarding Motor 
Cargo the premium refund wronqfu ;\ retained ty TIF: 
Respect
 r Sj •« * ^uO - ; it- < -J 9 . 
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